Equipped motto one vision, one identity, one community, ASEAN continued to move toward the establishment of an ASEAN Community 2015.

The opening of the ASEAN Charter explicitly mentions public commitment (We, the Peoples) ASEAN member countries to accelerate the establishment of the ASEAN Community based on three pillars, namely political cooperation and security, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation.

Commitment is once again confirmed the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) produced during the ASEAN Summit in Bali 9, October 2003, when Indonesia became the Chairman of ASEAN.

The word “We, the Peoples in the ASEAN Charter to show that the formation of the ASEAN community is not the desire of ASEAN member country governments alone, but rather a desire all layers of community members and stakeholders in ASEAN member countries.

Through the three pillars of cooperation mentioned in the Bali Concord II and reaffirmed in the Preamble of the ASEAN Charter, it is clear that the upcoming ASEAN community will consist of three communities, namely the ASEAN Security Community (ASEAN Security Community / ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (ASEAN Economic Community / AEC), and the ASEAN Social and Cultural Community (ASEAN Socio Cultural Community / ASCC).

To realize an ASEAN Community in 2015, many things that need to be done intensively in order to integrate ASEAN, especially in the early implementation of the ASEAN Charter relating to rules and regulations are still to be formulated together.

Here, then take battle of ideas from basic agreements that will set forth in the rules and policies implementation.

However, be aware that the provisions of the Charter is not as written in the Charter, but the big concepts that are behind it. That is why all the ASEAN Charter consists of 13 chapters and 55 articles, unlike the EU Constitution which consists of hundreds of articles.

Role of Indonesia

The success of ASEAN signed a charter with a strong foundation for the establishment of an ASEAN community and strengthen ASEAN’s role in dealing with a variety of architectural changes in the global cooperation.

In the midst of changing architecture of global cooperation and the battle of ideas is the role and bargaining power can be seen in Indonesia translating large concepts into terms that must be mutually agreed.

The view that the establishment of the ASEAN Community, Indonesia will suffer because of weak bargaining power of political and economic consequences of national economic position of weakness in the eyes of its neighbors is not strong.

It must be recognized since the collapse of the New Order and the 1997 economic crisis is prolonged, Indonesia is seen as a helpless country in the middle of some ASEAN member countries.

But beneath it all, slowly but surely, Indonesia began to show its fangs again with the various achievements of reach.

In the field of politics and security, pascareformasi, Indonesia became the leading countries that implement democracy in a state of life.

Indonesia is located precisely at the front guard of honor as well as enforcement of rights-human rights (human rights). Indonesia’s success in implementing a democratic government to make Indonesia as a democratic country to-4 in the world.

In the field of human rights, Indonesia is one of the first country in ASEAN which has a Commission on Human Rights.

In the economic field, for sure Indonesia began to show stability in economic growth. This can be seen from Indonesia’s ability to survive the economic crisis greater in 2008. If the 1997 economic crisis only affects the countries of Asia, the economic crisis in 2008 hit almost every country in the world.

Evidence that the success of Indonesia in the economic field recognized by other countries seem from the inclusion of Indonesia as one of the G-20 members.

All of this success is certainly a valuable asset to fight for Indonesia’s national interests, not only in ASEAN, but also in international forums.

In ASEAN, the Indonesians took the initiative to propose the establishment of an ASEAN community that not only rely on economic cooperation (as proposed Singapore), but there are also other aspects that must be considered, namely political cooperation and security, and then followed the socio-cultural cooperation.

Indonesia is struggling for inclusion of essential elements such as democratization and respect for human rights and the enforcement of political cooperation and security was then issued in the ASEAN Charter and the blueprint for political cooperation and security.

To demonstrate high bargaining power of Indonesia in ASEAN, can be conveyed that at the beginning of negotiations, Indonesia proposed to include elements of democratization and human rights was opposed by all ASEAN member countries.

But with a strong argument based on the experience of democracy and make enforcement and respect for human rights, eventually these elements can enter Charter.

Role of Indonesia in the Future

ASEAN appearance of new faces showed the ability of ASEAN member countries to conduct themselves in the face benah changes in the global architecture and to deepening and broadening with wicaranya partners (U.S., EU, Australia, New Zealand, India, China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia) .

In addition, providing hope that the ASEAN was able to create opportunities and transform challenges into opportunities.

As one of the founders of ASEAN, ASEAN alteration in a challenge for Indonesia to better show the new ASEAN kepimpinannya in order to welcome the establishment of the ASEAN community in 2015.

There is no ivory that was cracked, so did the role and leadership of Indonesia in ASEAN. Therefore, continued to improve leadership in Indonesia and ASEAN in the interests of our common duty of all to increase the bargaining power of Indonesia.

Written Aris Heru Utomo

The Linggajati Agreement was a key political accord in the struggle of Indonesia for Independence. When the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed its independence on August 17, 1945, right after Japanese surrender to the Allies, Colonialist Government of Dutch tried to regain control of the former East Indies by sending more troops to attack Indonesian strongholds. It was noticed that between 1945 and 1949 they undertook two military actions.

In this regard, the freedom fight continued and Dutch military aggressions met with solid resistance from Indonesian troops. Along with military action, the young Republic of Indonesian conducted also a diplomatic offensive against the Dutch. Indonesia raised the Dutch’s invasion to the United Nations and pushed the Dutch Government to negotiate.

In the United Nations, sponsored by the Soviet Unions, the question of Indonesia was discussed in the Security Council. Then on February 10, 1946, the first official meeting of Indonesian and Dutch representatives took place under the chairmanship of Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

In terms of negotiation, with the good offices of Lord Killearn of Great Britain, Indonesian and Dutch representatives met at Linggarjati in West Java on 11-13 November 1946. The Indonesian delegation consist of  Sutan Sjahrir (Head of Delegation), Mohammad Roem, Susanto Tirtoprodjo and AK Gani, while Dutch delegation consist of Prof. Ir. Schermeron (Head of Delegation), Max Van Poll, F de Boer and H.J Van Mook..

After taught negotiation, Indonesia and Dutch reached agreement as follows:

1. Both parties would establish a federation state which would call United States of Indonesia by 1 January 1949.
2. Both parties would continue their cooperation and establish the Union.
3. The Dutch Government recognized Republic of Indonesia sovereignty over Java, Sumatra and Madura.

When finally the Linggajati Agreement was signed on March 25, 1947 by Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir representing the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and Governor General H.J Van Mook representing the Dutch Government, we could acknowledge that this was the first time Indonesia have formal recognition for its sovereignty. Even this agreement did not cover all Indonesian regions, but by recognizing Java, Sumatra and Madura, Dutch has lost her main basis in the former East India. While conceding the other part of Indonesia was only a matter of time.

Reference : Wikipedia

Learning how to deal with each other as neighbors and major regional powers is critical not only for the two individual nations, but also for the broader region in general.

That is why regional cooperation institutions should assist them in finding the right modus vivendi. The role of the United States in supporting Japan is not helpful. It should be left to China and Japan to find the balance in their relationship.

In the early 1990s, following the bursting of its economic bubble, Japan entered a decade-long recession and deflation — a period that was prolonged by inadequate government policies, especially in the financial and banking sector. In the past few years, the economy has started to grow again, albeit slowly.

But now, again, Japan’s economy is in recession. Although the financial sector has been notably strengthened, dependency on exports is still high and demand has already slowed, while domestic consumption has not increased. Japan still faces several economic constraints, such as demographic problems including an aging society, inadequate productivity levels, low levels of foreign direct investment, rising poverty and worsening income inequality.

These are real issues that need to be tackled. It appears that Japanese leaders have been paying a great deal of attention to foreign policy and security, as well as to social issues such as education, but have not focused enough attention on the economy — especially in terms of continuing Koizumi’s economic reforms.

In the end, Japan’s leaders may be forced to take action to address problems associated with the country’s lackluster growth and aging population (much as Koizumi did with nonperforming loans) because these issues will place heavy financial pressures on voters.

Moreover, Japan’s economic needs intersect with the ambitious security goals of some of the country’s recent leaders: Japan needs to be economically stronger if it is going to be able to play a bigger role in East Asia. Meanwhile, political reforms have not been moving as fast as needed, which is hampering any other reforms.

In the end, the most important relationship for China is with the United States. Since the spy plane incident early in his first term, relations have been stable under President Bush. Both have tried to find common ground and expand on both security and economic ties, as well as on issues such as democracy and human rights.

The relationship between these two countries will always be one of both cooperation and competition. The intricate integration of their economies provides significant motivation for cooperation. China’s strategy not to push its own global and regional order but instead to adapt to the existing system of world governance (with a few exceptions when vital interests are involved) has greatly alleviated a lot of prejudice and misjudgment on the part of the United States (and the “West” in general).

Especially at this juncture, when the United States is under siege and has lost some soft power and ability to lead, China and East Asia in general have been farsighted and statesmanlike enough not to gloat or be arrogant regarding the mistakes of the United States. Not only is this wise, as the United States still has a lot of “power” left, but as history has shown, its political and economic system is flexible and innovative enough to be able to make corrections swiftly and come out even stronger. So the future of the United States is not completely a lost cause. After all, we are all in this financial mess together.

Besides, China does not have ideas incompatible with the rest of East Asia and has in general benefited from the existing international system, despite the occasional setback. It has not always been consistent, as many interests have to be balanced simultaneously.

Trends suggest that, in the longer term, the international system will be multipolar and see greater input and more ideas coming from East Asia and China.

How this current crisis of capitalism is ended, as dictated by the West, should be an indication of how soon this change in values and norms will happen.

East Asia and China should, as always, learn from history. Shifts of power have always been painful and many historical mistakes have been made as a result of arrogance and impatience.

We in East Asia, having always had a long historical perspective, should therefore be patient, cooperative and inclusive in all future developments of the global system of governance.

We have to be aware of our own weaknesses and deficiencies and improve on them. We should also be aware of our obligations (and rights) in this process of change in the international order. We must support a system that will bring welfare, peace and stability to East Asia.

The writer is vice chair of the Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation, Jakarta.

Source: The Jakarta Post

Strategic trends, namely how relations among the three big powers of the region (China, Japan and the United States) will unfold, will define future developments in East Asia.

China is doing well; it hosted the Olympic Games earlier this year and the world continues to talk about the nation’s excellent achievements. Despite the global financial crisis, China is forecasting economic growth of 8 percent for next year. This is a reduction from the current 11 percent, but still a very good achievement considering the circumstances.

Yet the crisis has yet to fully unfold and the extent of its damage remains something of a mystery. For China, global funds and foreign direct investment will be limited and exports will be curtailed because of the deep recessions that developed nations are facing. That is why China’s new policies, which will encourage domestic consumption and inject money into the banking system, are very wise.

However, China’s internal problems are huge, as Prime Minister Wen Jiabao himself admitted in a recent interview with Newsweek (Oct. 6, 2008). Poverty, a schism between coastal (urban) and inland (rural) populations, demographic and environmental problems (water, climate, desertification, energy, etc.), and how to properly govern with such rapid economic growth are all areas of concern.

The big question for China is how to maintain economic growth, while ensuring political stability and good governance. But the real challenge is preventing future crises: How can China keep its leadership united and not only determine but also enact the right policies for its future? This will require the support of the military and the obedience of local governments and party leaders.

These are big challenges, but the Chinese leadership aptly demonstrated its ability to make positive decisions, with the support of the people, during the dramatic earthquake in Szechuan last May.

They are aware of the problems. On the issue of good governance and the public sphere, they are trying a long-term, gradual approach, starting with elections in villages. The other big challenge is how to keep corruption under control. Questions have been raised as to whether efforts to stem corruption are too slow and tentative, and if the political system will allow a dramatic effort to get rid of such a systemic problem.

For the Chinese leadership, stability is of paramount concern. If the nation is to continue to develop so rapidly, rising demand, unemployment, poverty and inequality must be dealt with.

Rapid growth has become an important source of legitimacy for China’s now pragmatic leadership. Socialism has been practically abandoned (except rhetorically) in favor of a nationalist ideology that uses the Confucian tradition as a basis for Chinese identity.

Following several years of tension related to former Japanese prime minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine (which was seen as being extremely insensitive given past imperial ambitions), China has now established more cordial relations with Japan, since, with more US$200 billion worth of bilateral trade annually, both need each other economically.

While it is true that China has not paid sufficient attention to democratic developments in Japan post-World War II and its establishment of peaceful relations in the region and around the world, Japan needs to do more to recognize its past atrocities, including the “Nanking” massacre, and the abuses of Chinese prisoners by the Group 871 in Manchuria, as well as the so-called “comfort” women, with more consistency and openness.

Hopefully, a willingness to study history together and exchange large numbers of youth can slowly overcome prejudices on both sides. Meanwhile, relations between the two peoples have become quite intense: Four million Japanese visit China annually on more than 700 flights between the two countries weekly, more than 250 cities and prefectures have sistership relations and 70,000 Chinese students currently study in Japan.

But trust has to be created on both sides. East Asian regional cooperation organizations have been helping with this, but more could be done.

For Japan, trust will require greater transparency in Chinese policies, especially defense, along with political development toward good governance and pluralism. For China, it is Japan’s commiserations on history, especially regarding the period since 1936, that are important.

The writer is vice chair of the Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation, Jakarta.

Source: The Jakarta Post

In East Asia, South Korea was the first to be hit by the global crisis. A report by Citibank in early Oct. 2008 showed that in the region the S. Korean economy was the most vulnerable to external financial shocks, in terms of both the risk of a sudden stop and sudden reversal of financial flows.

Having experienced the 1997/1998 crisis, the region has established currency swap arrangements, known as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), to help each other in the eventuality of another such crisis. Eight years have elapsed, and a crisis is looming, but it remains uncertain as to how this arrangement can be invoked and what would trigger its use.

S. Korea has not attempted to make use of the CMI to prevent a crisis from unfolding. Under the CMI, Korea can exchange a mere US$17 billion with Japan and China, and additional insignificant amounts with other ASEAN countries. In view of the magnitude of the potential problem, the size of the CMI is too small. But perhaps the main reason for not resorting to this arrangement was that the CMI is still “an initiative”.

Instead, S. Korea’s president turned directly to Japan and China. In early October he proposed a trilateral meeting of the three countries’ finance ministers to coordinate policies to cope with the global financial crisis. He also proposed holding a summit amongst the three countries, suggesting that “the three countries can wisely overcome the financial crisis if they join forces”.

The most concrete and immediate swap of a significant amount (US$30 billion) was provided to S. Korea by the U.S. Federal Reserve. East Asia itself has accumulated international reserves of close to $4 trillion, but it was still talking about creating a regional fund of sorts.

In May 2008, ASEAN+3 finance ministers agreed to transform CMI into a much stronger Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) that can act as a “firewall” in the event of a regional financial crisis. They suggested that the CMIM would at least be $80 billion in size, with 80 percent contributed by China, Japan and S. Korea, and the remaining 20 percent by ASEAN countries. This “fund”, as already envisaged in 2007, should be a “self-managed reserved pooling” arrangement that would be governed by a single contract.

At the sidelines of the 7th ASEM in Beijing, leaders agreed to create an $80 billion regional, multilateral fund, based on the CMIM. To work out the funds’ details, a technical working meeting was held in Manila on Nov. 20, followed by a meeting of deputy finance ministers in Hakone on Nov. 28. Their recommendations were prepared for a meeting of finance ministers, originally scheduled for mid-December, before the ASEAN+3 Summit, with the expectation to receive the leaders’ endorsement for the fund to become operational in May 2009.

The Summit has been postponed to Feb. 24-26, 2009. The finance ministers will meet on Jan. 16, 2009. Their decision will have major implications for the institutionalization of cooperation arrangements in East Asia. To make the fund operational requires a political decision, which will mean settling the following important issues.

First, they must decide on the size of the fund, going beyond the initial suggestion of $80 billion. Proposals that have been aired range from $120 billion (the amount required during the 1997/1998 Asian crisis) to 10 percent of the total amount of the region’s international reserves.

Second, they need to agree on how to quickly disburse the fund and minimize conditionalities; for example — by increasing CMI’s 20 percent quick disbursing component to 50 percent.

Third, a strong regional surveillance mechanism will be required for the fund to be able to function. Who can organize an independent and credible surveillance mechanism?

Fourth — and an equally important concern — is the desirability of expanding the fund’s purpose beyond providing emergency liquidity in case of a foreign exchange crisis to providing liquidity support for (recapitalization of) financial institutions as well as to purchase toxic banking assets. There are other pending issues regarding the pooling structure and escape clause, as well as the inclusion of Hong Kong SAR into the scheme.

East Asia will need to act quickly and forcefully. At the ASEAN+3 Summit in Feb. 2009, they will need to agree on the operation of the CMIM and to a series of coordinated actions, including implementing counter-cyclical fiscal measures. They can invite other members of the East Asia Summit (EAS) to participate in many of their proposed actions.

These proposed courses of action will have wide-ranging implications for East Asia’s regional cooperation arrangements. Regional ambitions to develop various cooperation schemes are often hampered by the hard fact of deep-seated, narrowly defined sovereignty issues.

China, Japan and S. Korea held their first self-standing trilateral summit in Fukuoka on Dec. 13. This is a welcome development. In their Joint Statement they reiterated their commitment to work with ASEAN members to expedite the process of CMIM and strengthen the regional surveillance mechanism.

Most importantly, a regular trilateral summit could gradually eliminate the deep-seated reservations amongst them, which have been one obstacle to speedy regional progress.

The other obstacle is a lack of coherence in ASEAN. Independent, track-two regional institutional policy research projects, such as ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia), will be useful to prepare solid studies that can help overcome this problem.

The writer is executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.

Source: The Jakarta Post

Jusuf Wanandi is vice chair of the Board of Trustees of Indonesia’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Foundation and is a member of the (unrelated) Pacific Forum CSIS Board of Governors. This article originally appeared in The Jakarta Post.

It is an accepted wisdom that in international relations every nation pursues its own national interest. This notion is based on state sovereignty, the basis of relations between states since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

However, this principle has been eroded due to regional and international rules and institutions at the multilateral level, and civil societies and NGOs at the sub-national ones. Nonetheless, national interest and state sovereignty are still the central part of international relations, and it can be argued that globalization pressures, new threats of global/regional terrorism and threats of a non-conventional nature, such as pandemics, energy security and the environment, all will make the role of the state more important.

Indonesia is no exception. First and foremost, national interest should be pursued based on national sovereignty. Second, this could be constrained by regional and international rules and institutions, as national interest and regional/international interest develop in parallel or are integrated. ASEAN is designed as a regional entity, where the national interests of its members can be converged and become regional interests for common purposes. However, it has yet to realize this.

ASEAN was created to unite Southeast Asia, known as the Balkans of East Asia, to prevent conflicts and wars among each other, which had happened before, such as the confrontation in 1963-1965 between Indonesia and Malaysia and Singapore. Regional cooperation was meant to integrate Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s biggest member, into a regional entity, with rules and institutions that would guarantee peace and stability among members. This has been achieved in the last 40 years. ASEAN has become a successful Southeast Asian diplomatic entity. In addition, to a limited extent, it also has become an economic entity due to increased integration aimed at creating an economic community in 2015.

New challenges have emerged. Can ASEAN as a diplomatic institution and a limited economic entity face these new challenges, such as the rise of China and India, without deepening cooperation and integration among its members. The answer is obviously no, because ASEAN still consists of 10 sovereign countries as members. This could be acrimonious or limited to the lowest common denominator.

If ASEAN cannot move beyond its lowest common denominator, as defined by Laos or Myanmar, it is likely that Indonesia will seek to become more independent from ASEAN. In the last 40 years, Indonesia has become too dependent on ASEAN as the instrument of its foreign policy, and has constrained its freedom of action and use of other vehicles to implement its free and independent foreign policy. This was right in the first decades of ASEAN, to enable Indonesia to get the trust back from its neighbors. And Indonesia has achieved that. However, for the future, Indonesia needs to pursue its own national interests, on top of its loyalty and solidarity with ASEAN.

Following the regional financial crisis, Indonesia felt that it had been left behind by other ASEAN members. We were taking care of our political development, becoming a democracy. Other ASEAN members thought we had squandered our chances to recover. We should now get our act together and be brave enough to pursue our national interests.

ASEAN has failed to adjust to new challenges, as we found out in the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. Maybe it is true that basic differences in values and political systems will limit ASEAN to cooperation in common diplomatic stands and limited economic integration. This means that we should be more active in strengthening our bilateral relations with the big countries in the region: Japan, China and India, besides the United States. We should strive to develop closer cooperation with the big democracies among developing nations, such as Brazil, India and South Africa.

We should also take our role more seriously as the coordinator for Afro-Asia solidarity and cooperation. Economic cooperation within the Non-Aligned Movement is worthwhile to pursue, especially to promote food self-sufficiency and family planning.

Indonesia, with or without ASEAN’s support, should cooperate with China and India to assist Myanmar in its efforts to open up by having a credible roadmap to democracy.

In the meantime ASEAN should be strengthened to be able to play a more important role. What is absolute for Indonesia’s public opinion concerning the ASEAN Charter is a credible human rights body. In addition, the ASEAN foreign ministers should assure that decision-making in the grouping should not only be based on consensus. ASEAN should have adequate funding and members’ contributions should not be defined by the least able member. Furthermore, sanctions for not living up to the charter and other important decisions should be stronger than simply reporting it to the leaders.

These are the minimum requirements for the ASEAN Charter to be acceptable to the Indonesian public. Without that, it will be difficult for the Indonesian Parliament to sign the treaty, and for civil societies to endorse it.

Source: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0827.pdf

Is it time to invade Burma? Actually the title in TIME should be “Is it time for the U.S to invade Burma? Since only the U.S have capabilities in leading invasion to other countries for a long time periode. Right now the U.S have theirown fleets in the Southeast Asia region and ready to deploy its troops in very short time.

Back to the question, I agree with the opinon of the majority of respondents in a poll counducted by TIME. Almost 72% of the 5857 respondents (as of 13 May, 01.A.M) says no to the option to invade Myanmar to distibute humanitarian aid. The Bush Administration itself has so far rejected the idea and prefer to have permission of Myanmar government.

China itself have the same problems. A powerful earthquake toppled buildings, schools and chemical plants Monday ( 12 May 2008 ) in central China, killing more than 8,700 people and trapping untold numbers in mounds of concrete, steel and earth in the country’s worst quake in three decades. China will focus on its internal affairs than interfere into Myanmar internal affairs. While gaining support from Indonesian militaries will confront a resistance of Indonesia community who are thinking that the U.S will only steads Indonesia to enter Myanmar.

Of course, this policy is totally different with U.S unilateraly actions in Bosnia and Sudan. In both countries, the U.S has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid without the government’s consent in places.

Why the U.S looks reluctant to invade Myanmar? Well, geographically Myanmar is in Southeast Asia region and a member of ASEAN. If the U.S take a unilateral action, not only Myanmar government will reject it, but the other ASEAN countries will have strong protest as well.

Referring to the other option, likes pressuring China to use its influence over the the junta and asking support of Thailand and Indonesian militaries to carry out releife missions, I am not quite sure that it will be successfull.

Finally, out of the disaster in Myanmar, Indonesia could take these opportunity for Indonesian national interest by among others: implementing disaster diplomacy and pressure the U.S

The 9 May is Europe Day, the commemoration of the proposal by Robert Schuman on the creation of an organised Europe, indispensable to maintenance of peaceful relations on 9 May 1950. Seven years later, it was followed by the signing of Treaty of Rome on 27 March 1957. Six founding countries namely Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the Treaty. Today, the 9th of May has become an European symbol (Europe Day) which, along with the flag, the anthem, the motto and the single currency (the euro), identifies the political entity of the EU.

Since the the EU has grown from 6 original member countries to 27 today, expending its original role promoting economic cooperation into an integrated bloc which share currency, common borders and cooperation on areas ranging from the environment and immigration to defence and foreign policy. It shows the achievement of the evolution process of the European integration from the start to the various stages of the integration project: Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, European Community, European Union.

Considering the achievement of the European Union integration, we should take notice that those process of integration obviously involved Eastern Europe countries and Balkan which were belong to Communist bloc during the cold war. At that moment, it was difficult to construct cooperation with those countries under the same common position.

With regard to the EU’s achievement on the process of integration, we are also seeing that at this time the EU are challenged by internal issues such as streamlining the economic differentiation in each member countries; particularly refer to the 12 new member countries which joined to the EU since 1 May 2004 and 1 January 2007.

In the political and security cooperation, it’s seem that the EU is trying to enhance its profile in international fora. In this context we can see the EU involvement into conflicts in Middle East, Iran, Darfur as well as monitoring the general election in Aceh. With its modalities, the EU could maintain its role in maintaining political and security issues.

In this regard we should consider the revival of the EU power to influence the development of other regions which will cover issues among other are economic and trade as well as political and economic issues, principally for the developing countries

In the 1990′s, political tension in the South China Sea was high. The dispute territorial claims in the South China Sea remain a dangerous source of potential conflict in the absence of preventive measures to forestall a military or political crisis. Six claimant countries, Brunei Darussalam, China, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam, have claims in this region and some of them have sent their military force to the region.

Considering this political situation, in 1990 Indonesia convened a first workshop to manage potential conflicts in the South China Sea. Regardless of the territorial disputes, Indonesia tried to find out ways to manage potential conflict and to find an area or areas in which everyone could agree to co-operate, no matter how small or how insignificant it might seem to be.

The First Workshop in Bali in 1990 was specifically and exclusively attended by ASEAN participants so that they could lay down the groundwork. But in the Second Workshop in Bandung in 1991 it had become a very “inclusive” group; not only Vietnam and China were invited but also Taiwan. Even land-locked Laos was also invited. Cambodia was invited later after the political situation there became clearer.

After a series of meetings, finally the participants agreed to conduct a join research on biodiversity in 2002. The first joint research was in March 2002, scientists from the South China Sea region conducted a major biodiversity expedition, called Anambas expedition, to the waters of the Anambas and Natuna Islands in Indonesia. The two-week expedition obtained over 3.000 specimens representing a large diversity of plant and animal species. Many were new records for the area, and some were new to science.

The expedition itself turned out to be more than a scientific mission. Not only was Exercise Anambas a trip to explore biodiversity, it also served a political purpose, to promote regional scientific collaboration among countries surrounding the South China Sea. The expedition made history, as it was the first that got scientists from different countries of the South China Sea working together.

Indonesian efforts in conducting the workshop appreciated by ASEAN. In the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila in July 1992, ASEAN Ministers noted that the workshop on managing potential conflicts in the South China Sea initiated and hosted by Indonesia had contributed to a better understanding of the issues involved. The success of the joint research shown the successfull of second track diplomacy by scientist. It shown that in instance of conflict there was always an opportunity for co-operation.